An American Empire

Max Boot, makes a lot of relevant points in his novel devoted to small wars and the rise of American power, The Savage Wars of Peace. “The United States Congress has declared war against other nations on only five occasions: against Britain in 1812, Mexico in 1846, Spain in 1898, the Central Powers in 1917 and the Axis in 1941,” however, administrations have committed troops to battle at least double those occasions. Therefore, it would be safe to say the United States knew a thing or two about small wars. In fact, the Marine Corps produced a Small Wars Manual which contained an action plan, using all of the principles that worked successfully in previous small wars. The manual ultimately represents the concept that “when a successful project is undertaken in a village, we must spread the word to other villages much more effectively than we have been doing”. In plain words, the manual stated “this Government has interposed or intervened in the affairs of other states with remarkable regularity, and it may be anticipated that the same general procedure will be followed in the future”. The manual, written in 1940 stated that the plan used for the previous successful small wars, would be applicable to those in the future.

Boot claims that the troops need to re-train, learning small war tactics to apply for what is ahead. The United States lost Vietnam because it tried big war tactics in an area that small war tactics would have been more beneficial. Too heavy of a military presence is not the way to go into a country; right away you are invading as opposed to helping.

The American Empire has been built from the ground up, tackling whatever has been thrown its way. Whether it has been small wars, or even civil wars. America has a duty to keep on fighting small wars to contribute to the world’s security. Boot is ultimately writing to the American public outlining what should and should not be done. The Powell Doctrine, a post-Vietnam policy that “for more than 200 years, the United States military has routinely violated”. After Vietnam, instead of realizing that better “strategies and tactics in fighting small wars” should be learned, they came to the conclusion that “they should avoid fighting altogether”. The Powell Doctrine on many different levels makes sense, however, it follows the post-Vietnam mindset of if war must happen, the United States must win with “overwhelming force, suffer few casualties and leave immediately”. When possible, that is a great theory to go by, however when battle commences, troops must be in the mindset that they are there until the job is done. At the end of his book, Boot concludes, "In deploying American power, decision makers should be less apologetic, less hesitant, less humble. Yes, there is a danger of imperial overstretch and hubris -- but there is an equal, if not greater, danger of undercommitment and lack of confidence. America should not be afraid to fight `the savage wars of peace' if necessary to enlarge the empire of liberty.' It has done it before."